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ENTRY TO ARREST A SUSPECT IN A THIRD PARTY'S HOME:
NINTH CIRCUIT OPENS THE DOOR-UnitedStates v.
Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct 1309 (1984).
The late 1970's marked a judicial movement toward more restrictive
interpretations of who may invoke the exclusionary rule under the fourth
amendment.I At the same time, the Court continued to emphasize fourth
amendment protection for individual privacy rights in the home. 2 In
United States v. Underwood,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
an issue, not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, which presented these
two themes in opposition: whether a suspect arrested in a third party's
home pursuant to an arrest warrant could successfully suppress evidence
seized incident to the arrest by challenging the absence of a search warrant.
This Note examines the Supreme Court's conflicting policies and how
the Underwood court resolved them. To set a framework for analyzing
the case, it discusses the Supreme Court's protection of privacy rights in
the home and the Court's recent limitations on the standing doctrine. 4 The
Note reviews the facts and holding of Underwood, then illustrates both
the problems with the court's reasoning and those created by its decision
to uphold the search. Finally, this Note suggests that the Ninth Circuit's
1. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (Court overruled automatic
standing rule for defendants charged with possessory crimes, holding that defendants may invoke the
exclusionary rule only when their own fourth amendment rights have been violated); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-43 (1978) (Court replaced broad fourth amendment standing inquiry with
more restrictive expectations of privacy test); see infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part IA.
3. 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309 (1984).
4. In Rakas, the Court rejected the standing terminology by concluding that the determination of
whether a defendant could assert a fourth amendment violation need not be separate from the defendant's substantive fourth amendment claim. 439 U.S. at 138-39. Although the Court attempted to
merge the standing inquiry into a defendant's substantive claim, courts continue to employ a traditional two-step approach. The first step, determining whether a defendant has established an expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge a search, is basically the standing inquiry that Rakas purportedly rejected. See United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 1983) (in cases where
defendant is challenging a search and seizure, "courts should first focus on the issue of standing").
In effect, the Court merely substituted the "expectation of privacy" test for the previous "legitimately on the premises" standing test. See infra notes 33-41. The issue remains whether the defendant has standing to challenge the search. Accord United States v. Underwood, 693 F.2d 1306, 1307
(9th Cir. 1982) (advance sheets, copy on file with the Washington Law Review), withdrawn, 704
F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983); Slobogin, Capacity to
Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passingof Old Rules and Some SuggestionsforNew Ones, 18 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 387, 387 (1981). LaFave not only continues to separate his discussions of standing and
substantive fourth amendment analysis in his treatise on search and seizure, see 2 W. LAFAVE.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 6.1; 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE. § 11.3 (1978 & Supp. 1984), but

also employs standing terminology in his discussions of Rakas. 3 W. LAFAVE. supra, § 11.3, at
216-19 (Supp. 1984).
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approach in Underwood was wrong and proposes, instead, a two-step test
for analyzing similar search and seizure cases. Not only is this approach
analytically consistent with Supreme Court precedent, but it also allows
wider use of the exclusionary rule to suppress illegally seized evidence
than is possible under the Underwood holding.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Home Arrests: Payton and Steagald

Throughout the development of fourth amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court has afforded utmost protection to the home. 5 The Court has
traditionally required government agents to secure search warrants before
entering private residences to search for and seize incriminating evidence. 6 For entries to arrest, however, no such requirement existed until
1980. 7 Many state statutes authorized police to enter private residences to
make arrests without first satisfying any warrant requirement. 8 Thus,
while all citizens could expect fourth amendment protection against governmental seizure of possessions in their homes, they could not rely on
the same protection against seizures of their persons while in their
homes. 9
In Payton v. New York' ° the Supreme Court recognized and eliminated
this inconsistency, holding that absent exigent circumstances or consent,
police may not cross the threshold of a home without a warrant." t The
Court noted that the fourth amendment was drafted to prevent the indiscriminate and widespread searches made under the guise of general
warrants and that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil" against

5. For a comprehensive discussion of the Court's commitment to privacy interests in the home.
see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980): see also Comment. Warrantless Entries to
Arrest Suspects in the Homes of Third Parties After Payton v. New York. 9 AM J. CRIM L. 51.
65-68 (1981): Note. Arresting a Suspect in a Third Party's Home: What Is Reasonable?. 72 J. CRIM
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293, 316-18 (1981).
6. A brief discussion can be found in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204.211 (1981). and
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S, 573, 587-88 (1980).
7. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (creating warrant requirement for entries to
arrest).
8. See id. at 598 n.46 (overruled 23 such statutes). The New York statute overruled by the Court
in Payton authorized police to enter any private home without a warrant to make a routine felony
arrest. Id. at 574.
9. See Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: The Seizure of a Suspect in the Home of
a ThirdParty, 54 CoNN B.J. 299, 301 (1980).
10. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
11.
Id. at 590.
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which the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment are directed. 12
In Payton, the Court stated that privacy interests of an arrestee in his
home deserve the same constitutional protection as the privacy interests
of a subject of a residence search. 13 After declaring that the fourth amendment applies equally to seizures of property and seizures of people in the
home, however, the Court stated that police may lawfully enter a suspect's own home to arrest him when they have a valid arrest warrant and
reason to believe the suspect is inside. 14 Acknowledging that an arrest
warrant affords the suspect less protection than a search warrant, 15 the
Court failed to explain why an arrest warrant was constitutionally sufficient. 16 The Court merely stated that when there is evidence of a person's
participation in a felony sufficient to show probable cause for his arrest, it
is "constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the
officers of the law." 17 The Court concluded that implicit in a valid arrest
warrant is the "limited authority" to enter the suspect's own home when
there is reason to believe the suspect is inside. 18
During the term following the Payton decision, the Court again addressed police entries to arrest without a search warrant, this time in a
third party residence setting. In Steagald v. United States,19 the Court
12. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
13. The Court noted that arrest is a species of seizure and that the language of the amendment
applies equally to seizures of property and seizures of people. 445 U.S. at 585; see also Mascolo,
supranote 9, at 302.
14. 445 U.S. at 603. Arguably, this language from Payton is dicta because in the case itself the
police acted without any warrant at all. Payton could be narrowly construed to hold only that statutes
authorizing police entry without any warrant are unconstitutional. This argument was considered but
rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484-86 (1983) (citing
several cases which refer to the Payton dicta as its rule), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309.
15. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602.
16. A search warrant is issued upon a probable cause showing that evidence of a crime is at a
particular location. An arrest warrant is issued upon a probable cause showing that the named suspect
committed a crime. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Attempting to explain the apparent
inconsistency in Payton, two commentators have suggested that the majority was swayed by the
state's argument that a search warrant requirement would be impracticable, but sought to lessen the
arrest warrant-search warrant probable cause gap with a requirement that police have a reason to
believe the suspect is at home before entering. Feiner & Reilly, CriminalProcedure, 1981 ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 561, 564. Another writer has suggested that the Court's reluctance to impose a search
warrant requirement was based on its conclusion that the added protection of a search warrant given
to a suspect in his own home did not outweigh the potential diversion of police resources inherent in a
search warrant requirement. Mascolo, supranote 9, at 302 v.23. Several writers, criticizing the result
in Payton, have suggested that the Court should have imposed a search warrant requirement. See,
e.g., The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REv. 75, 186 (1980); Note, supra note 5, at 322;
see also Groot, Arrests in PrivateDwellings, 67 VA. L. REv. 275,282-83 (1981).
17. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-03.
18. Id. at603.
19. 451 U.S. 204(1981).
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held that, absent exigent circumstances or consent, police must obtain a
search warrant before entering the home of a third party to make an arrest. 20 In Steagald, police had a valid arrest warrant for suspect Ricky
Lyons and made a non-consensual entry into a third party home to search
for him. Although they did not find Lyons, they did find narcotics. As a
result, the homeowner, Steagald, 2 1 was indicted on federal drug
charges. 22 The Supreme Court held that the warrantless search violated
Steagald's fourth amendment rights. 23 Reiterating the Payton policy of
utmost protection for the home, the Court found that an arrest warrant
provides insufficient protection for a third party when police enter his
24
home to search for and arrest a different person.
In Steagald, the Court relied on the difference between arrest warrants
and search warrants. An arrest warrant is issued upon a probable cause
showing that the person named in the warrant has committed a crime. It
protects people from the unreasonable and unnecessary seizure inherent
in an arrest not based on probable cause. 25 A search warrant, however, is
issued upon a probable cause showing that evidence of a crime is at a
particular location. It protects people's privacy interests in their homes
26
and personal effects.
The Court concluded that only a search warrant provides adequate protection when police search a third party's residence for a suspect named in
an arrest warrant. Distinguishing Payton, the Court reasoned that although the arrest warrant authorized an entry into Lyons' home to arrest
Lyons, 27 it provided no constitutional protection for Steagald or his
20.

Id. at 205-06.

21.

Steagald was not in fact the homeowner: he was apparently a visitor in the home. However.

because the government failed to raise this issue at the trial court level, the Court refused to address it
on appeal. Id. at 208-11. Had the government argued that Steagald lacked the requisite expectation
of privacy, the Court would have faced the standing issue. It would then have provided closer guidelines for the Ninth Circuit to decide Underwood, although the case still would have been distinguish-

able because Steagald was not named in the arrest warrant while Underwood was.
22. Id. at 207.
23. Id. at 213-14.
24. Id. at 212-14. The Court stated that entry into a private home to search or arrest is per se
unreasonable unless pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 211. Explaining that the purpose of the warrant
requirement is to place a neutral magistrate between the police and the citizen. id. at 212. the Court
noted that it has consistently held that police determinations of probable cause are not reliable enough

to justify entry except in a few well-defined circumstances. Id. at 213-14. Finally, the court stressed
that the commands of the fourth amendment do not discriminate between entries to search for objects
and entries to search for people, and that both require a warrant. Id. at 214 n.7.

25.

Id. at 213.

26. Id.
27. Explaining the Payton arrest warrant requirement, the Court stated that, "'[because an arrest
warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited
invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home." Id. at 214

n.7.
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home, and was insufficient to deprive him of any privacy or liberty interest. 28 The Court stated that a contrary result would create a substantial
potential for abuse because police could search all the homes of a suspect's friends and acquaintances solely on the basis of an arrest warrant
for the suspect. 29 Further, an arrest warrant could serve as a pretext for
entering homes in which police suspect illegal actvity taking place, but
30
lack sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant.
Together, Payton and Steagaldprovide the Supreme Court's guidelines
on entries to arrest. In Payton the Court concluded that an arrest warrant
combined with reason to believe the suspect is inside is constitutionally
sufficient for entry to arrest a suspect in his own home. In Steagald, however, the Court insisted that entry into another's residence to arrest a suspect requires the judicial determination of probable cause embodied in a
search warrant to protect the third party's privacy interests.
B.

The Contemporary "Standing" Doctrine-ReasonableExpectations
of Privacy

The standing doctrine determines which defendants may invoke the
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence seized during an illegal search. 31
Not all illegally seized evidence is suppressible; rather, each defendant
must establish a violation of his own fourth amendment rights before invoking the benefits of the exclusionary rule. 32 While in Payton and Steagaid the Court called for stronger fourth amendment protection of individual rights, in other cases the Court has significantly narrowed the class of
persons who may successfully seek to suppress evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
The standing doctrine was originally based on property rights and extended only to defendants who established a proprietary interest in either
34
33
the area searched or the evidence seized. In Jones v. United States,
the Supreme Court expanded the doctrine by holding that any person
28. Id. at 213.
29. Id. at 215.
30. Id.
31. See generally 3 W. LAFAVE. supranote 4, § 11.3; see also Slobogin, supra note 4 (discussion of recent developments in the law of standing); Note, Criminal Procedure-The Demise of
Standing to Assert FourthAmendment Violations, 3 W. NEw ENo. L. REv. 527 (1981) (same); Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock on Any Door"-HomeArrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 DICK. L. REv.
191, 233-238 (1982) (effect of recent standing developments on Payton and Steagald); Mascolo,
Arresting a Suspect in the Home of a Third Party:The Issue of Standing or Legitimate Expectations
of Privacy, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 381 (1982) (same).
32. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
33. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 389; Note, supranote 31, at 527-28.
34. 362U.S. 257 (1960).
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"legitimately on the premises" during a search had standing to challenge
the legality of the search. 35 Additionally, any defendant charged with a
possessory crime was granted "automatic standing." 36 This avoided the
conflict defendants faced when statements of ownership made at supression hearings were admitted on the issue of guilt at trial.
Rakas v. Illinois37 marked the demise of the liberal standing policies
under Jones. Reasoning that the Jones "legitimately on the premises"
standard was too broad, the Court reformulated the standing doctrine
based on the substantive fourth amendment doctrine of legitimate expectations of privacy. 38 The Court held that before invoking the exclusionary
rule, a defendant must establish that the search violated his or her own
legitimate expectation of privacy. 39 Several commentators have interpreted Rakas and its progeny ° as requiring that defendants show a proprietary interest in the area searched to establish a legitimate expectation of
41
privacy.

35. Id. at 267.
36. Id. at 263-64, 267. For a discussion of the automatic standing rule, see Mascolo, supra note
31, at 384-85; Note, supra note 31, at 532-33. The doctrine of automatic standing has since been
overruled. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
37. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
38. Id. at 143. The expectations of privacy analysis for substantive fourth amendment rights
originated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the Court replaced the old property-based definition of fourth amendment rights with a much broader "expectations of privacy"
definition. Id. at 351-52. In Katz, the Court greatly expanded the scope of fourth amendment protections, stating that the fourth amendment protects "people, not places," and what a person "seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id.
at 351. Justice Harlan's concurrence suggested that the fourth amendment extends protection to expectations of privacy which society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 360-62, (Harlan, J.
concurring). This expectation of privacy test was later adopted by a majority of the Court. See United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,9 (1968). For a discussion
of Katz and expectations of privacy, see Amsterdam, Perspectives of the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN L. REV 349, 382-88 (1974).
39. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. In Katz the expectations of privacy language was designed to expand the scope of fourth amendment protection beyond property concepts to include expectations of
privacy. 389 U.S. at 351-53. In Rakas the Court used this language to restrict the procedural fourth
amendment standing inquiry. See Ashdown, The FourthAmendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV 1289, 1294 (1981); Harbaugh & Faust. supra note 31. at 234:
Slobogin, supra note 4, at 393-97.
40. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980), the Court overruled the automatic
standing rule for defendants charged with possessory crimes. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98.
106 (1980), the Court held that a defendant did not establish the requisite expectation of privacy in an
acquaintance's purse to challenge a search of its contents.
41.
Feiner & Reilly, supra note 16, at 579 n. 149; Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 31. at 233-37:
Mascolo, supra note 31. at 387-88; Note, supra note 31, at 537-38. Arguably. Rakas need not be
interpreted so narrowly. See infra Part IIIC.
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HI.

UNITED STATES V. UNDERWOOD: FACTS AND HOLDING

Jack Underwood was an escapee from a federal correctional institution.
An informant told police that Underwood was staying at the house of a
friend, Johnny Duckett, and that he had a weapon secreted in a black
coffin-like box. 42 Acting under the authority of an arrest warrant for
Underwood, police went to Duckett's home and announced their presence. 43 Receiving no response, the police made a non-consensual entry. 44
They searched for and found Underwood, armed, hiding in a bedroom
closet. They arrested him and seized the box containing a shotgun, which
45
they also found in the closet.
Underwood was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm
and possession of a firearm by a felon. 46 The district court granted his
motion to suppress the weapons. The trial judge noted that the arrest warrant was valid and that police had reason to believe Underwood was inside, but held that the entry into Duckett's house without a search warrant
violated the fourth amendment. 47 On appeal, a three-judge panel af49
firmed.4 8 On rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The majority concluded that the case was controlled by Payton v. New
York. 50 The court stated that, for purposes of fourth amendment violations, nothing turned on the fact that in Payton the arrestee was in his own
home while Underwood was in a third party's home. 5 1 The court reasoned that a person has no greater rights of privacy in a third party's home
than in his own home. 52 It concluded that Underwood's rights were not
violated because the police met the Payton requirements: an arrest war53
rant for the defendant and reason to believe he was inside.
42. 717 F.2d 482, 483 (9th Cir. 1983); Brief for Appellant at 7, United States v. Underwood,
717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
43. 717 F.2d at 483.
44. Id.; Brief for Appellant, supranote 42, at 6-7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Underwood, 693 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982) (advance sheets, copy on file
with the Washington Law Review), withdrawn, 704 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc, 717
F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Underwood, 717 F.2d at 486.
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id. at 484.
52. Id.
53. Id. Similar reasoning was recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Buckner,
717 F.2d 297 (1983) (defendant arrested in third party home by police who acted without search
warrant did not establish requisite expectation of privacy; even if he had, under Pavton the arrest
warrant was sufficient because defendant could not assert greater rights of privacy in third party's
home than in his own home). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a suspect has no greater
right of privacy in a third party's home than the third party, who is protected under Pavton by an
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The four dissenting judges argued that the majority's holding was an
unnecessary extension of Payton.54 The dissent reasoned that the Payton
decision represented a narrow exception to the search warrant require56
ment, 55 and that the principles of Steagald and Ninth Circuit precedent
provided the proper guidelines for deciding the case. 57 It concluded that
Underwood, an invited guest with a legitimate expectation of privacy in
Duckett's home, could challenge the warrantless entry and that the absence of a search warrant resulted in an unlawful search under the fourth
amendment.58

III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Analytical and PracticalProblems Created by Underwood

The Underwood case falls between the Payton and Steagald fact patterns. In Payton the Court addressed the rights of a suspect in his own
home and held that police may enter to arrest him when they have a valid
arrest warrant and reason to believe that he is inside. 59 Steagald addressed
the rights of a third party homeowner when police enter his home to
search for a non-resident suspect named in an arrest warrant and held that
police must obtain a search warrant before entering the third party's
home. 60 In Underwood the court addressed the rights of a suspect arrested
in a third party's home when police enter without a search warrant but
pursuant to an arrest warrant for him and with reason to believe that he is
inside. 6 1 The Ninth Circuit was, therefore, without explicit direction from
the Supreme Court for deciding Underwood.
Rather than extending Payton, the Underwood court should have applied Steagald, which was more closely on point. By extending Payton,
arrest warrant and reason to believe that he is inside. United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090. 1093
(8th Cir. 1981). LaFave comments that "such bizarre reasoning renders Steagald a virtual nullity." 3
W. LAFAVE. supra note 4, § 11.3, at 221 (Supp. 1984). But cf. Mascolo. supra note 9. at 307 n.52
and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 486 (Skopil, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at487.
56. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978) involved facts similar to Payton.
The Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction of a homeowner whose home was entered and searched
by police without a warrant. The court held that "[tihe warrant, whatever it be called, must describe
'the place to be searched .... and the persons or things to be seized' ....
ld. at 1350. The
Underwood dissent argued that this language suggested a search warrant requirement. 717 F.2d at
489 (Skopil, J., dissenting).
57. 717 F.2d at 486.
58. Id. at 486-87.
59. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
61. Seesupra Part I.
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the court ignored both the policies of fourth amendment doctrine expressed in Payton and Steagald, and the language of the fourth amendment itself.62 In addition, by failing to provide guidelines for police to
follow in applying the reasonable belief standard, the court invited abusive violations of the Steagaldsearch warrant requirement.
The reasoning of the court in Underwood extends Payton beyond its
self-imposed limitations. In Payton, the Court expressly limited its holding to entries into a suspect's own home to effect his arrest. 63 The Court
flatly stated that it was making no determinations concerning the authority
of police to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect. 64 In Steagald,
on the other hand, the Court specifically addressed the is.sue of entries
into third party homes and held that police must secure a search warrant
65
before entry. Thus Steagaldwas the proper precedent to apply.
The policies underlying Payton and Steagald also suggest that the
Underwood court improperly extended Payton. Both decisions stressed
the importance of privacy interests in the home and set specific warrant
requirements for entries into private residences to make arrests. 66 In Payton, the Court adopted the policy that entries to search and entries to arrest are equally protected by the fourth amendment; in Steagald, the
Court required a search warrant to enter a third party's home to arrest a
suspect. 67 If search and arrest entries require equal constitutional protection, then the less protective arrest warrant requirement of Payton makes
sense only when viewed as an exception to the general search warrant
rule. The exception is based on the implicit determination embodied in an
arrest warrant that a suspect is likely to be found at home and strengthened by the police's actual belief that the suspect is at home at the time of
entry. 68 Together, Payton and Steagald stand for the principle that police
must secure a search warrant before entering any private residence to arrest a suspect unless entries are: (1) consensual, 69 (2) under exigent

62. See Note, supranote 5, at 297-311; see also supranotes 10-30 and accompanying text.
63. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
64. Id. at 583.
65. Although in Steagald it was the third-party homeowner who challenged the search, the arrestee's ability to challenge the absence of a search warrant is a standing inquiry separate from the
warrant issue. In his section on entries to arrest, LaFave poses a hypothetical identical to the facts of
Undervood and then suggests that the true issue is standing, which he addresses in another section of
his treatise. 2 W. LAFAVE, supranote 4, § 6. 1, at 130 (Supp. 1984).
66. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-590, 603; Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211, 222.
67. See supranotes 13-30 and accompanying text.
68. See Underwood, 717 F.2d at 487 (Skopil, J., dissenting); Note, supranote 5, at 300.
69. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
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circumstances, 70 or (3) into a suspect's own home pursuant to a valid ar-

71
rest warrant and with reason to believe the suspect is inside.
The language of the fourth amendment commands that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.' ,72 Thus, the probable cause determinations under the
warrant clause are threefold: connection to the crime, persons or things to
be seized, and location. These requirements permit judicial control over
the scope of a search. 73 A search warrant embodies the probable cause
determination that certain things or persons which will aid in apprehension or conviction of a crime are located in a specific place. 74 An arrest
warrant, on the other hand, embodies only the probable cause determination that a suspect committed a crime, which makes that suspect seiz-

able, 75 but includes no determination as to the suspect's probable wherea-

bouts. 76 An arrest warrant lacks the judicial control over the scope of a
search for a suspect. Thus, in Underwood, the court ignored the explicit
fourth amendment criteria when it upheld the warrantless entry to search
77
for and arrest Underwood.
Underwood not only fails analytically, but it presents practical problems as well. The holding provides no guidelines for police to apply the
"reason to believe the suspect is inside" standard. It therefore creates the
potential for the very abuse warned against by the Supreme Court in
Steagald.78 Once police have an arrest warrant for a suspect, nothing in
the Underwood holding prevents them from reasonably believing that the
suspect is staying with friends, relatives, or acquaintances and subsequently conducting warrantless searches of each and every home until the
suspect is found. 79 By delegating the probable cause determination that a
suspect is in a given home to the police, the Underwood holding fails to
prevent and indeed encourages unconstitutional police activity.
70.
71.

See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30. 34-35 (1970).
See Pavton, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1983).

72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
73. Note, supra note 5, at 298.
74. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213: Groot. supra note 16. at 282 (1981).
75. Steagald. 457 U.S. at 213.
76. See Groot, supra note 16, at 281-82; Note, supra note 5, at 298.
77. Although there are several recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement. none
applied in Underwood. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text; see also infra note 93 and
accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
79. Accord Comment, supranote 5. at 61 (probable cause standard for police better than reasonable belief standard, but both leave decision of whether to enter private premises to police rather than
to judiciary). Private § 1983 actions tend not to be a desirable remedy for fourth amendment violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see infra note 94.
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B.

A Two-step Analysis of Underwood: Expectations of Privacy and

Steagald
The Underwood court reached the wrong result because it applied the

wrong law. The Rakas and Steagald decisions provide the proper guidelines and suggest that the court should have conducted a two-step analysis. First, it should have decided whether Underwood had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in Duckett's home. This is the standing inquiry
transformed by Rakas,80 which the court in Steagald did not address. 8 1

Second, had the court concluded that Underwood met the Rakas test, it
should then have determined whether the entry without a search warrant
was unconstitutional. Under this approach, the court should have concluded that (1) Underwood, as an overnight guest, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Duckett's home and could therefore challenge the
search, and (2) the entry was unconstitutional because no search warrant
exception applied. The dissent correctly concluded that police violated
Underwood's fourth amendment right to privacy when they entered the
82
house without a search warrant.
There is no simple test for determining whether a guest in a third
party's home has a sufficient legitimate expectation of privacy to enjoy
fourth amendment protection. 83 Courts have found or failed to find legitimate expectations of privacy through a "totality of the circumstances"
approach, analyzing facts on a case-by-case basis. 84

80. See supranote 4.
81. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 219. There is some confusion in Undervood about the expectations of
privacy issue. The majority never addressed the issue in the body of its opinion, yet the dissent stated
that the majority did not contest the fact that Underwood had a legitimate expectation of privacy. 717
F.2d at 486 n. 1 (Skopil, J., dissenting). If this is the case, then the majority may have followed the
line of reasoning adopted by other circuits that even if a defendant can establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a third party's home, he is constitutionally protected under Pavton by an arrest
warrant and a reason to believe that he is inside. See supra note 53. This conclusion misconstrues
Payton. See supranotes 63-71 and accompanying text.
82. Undenvood, 717 F.2d at 486 (Skopil, J., dissenting).
83. In several cases with facts similar to those in Undenvood, courts have concluded that the
defendant-guest did not establish a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy. CompareUnited
States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendant-guest visiting mother's home possessed
no expectation of privacy) and United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981) (defendantguest in friend's home between two and six hours possessed no expectation of privacy) vith United
States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 858 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant-guest staying overnight and
storing personal belongings in friend's home possessed expectation of privacy) and Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 126, 141-42 (1978) (court notes that in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 257, defendantguest staying alone in friend's apartment possessed expectation of privacy).
84. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 399-416. The general factors of the totality of the circumstances test include: interest in the searched premises, including the ability to exclude other persons;
interest in the items seized; and precautions taken to protect privacy. Id. at 400-416.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 59:965, 1984

A close examination of the Underwood facts reveals that Underwood
possessed a constitutionally protected, legitimate expectation of privacy
85
in Duckett's home. The facts are strikingly similar to those in Jones.
Although Rakqs ended the Jones "legitimately on the premises" standing
inquiry, the Court did not overrule the holding of that case. Rather, it
stated that the defendant in Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the area searched and would therefore have met the Rakas test. 86 Jones
was an invited overnight guest who had a suit and shirt in the apartment.
He was the only occupant at the time of the warrantless search, and had
the use of a key. 87 These combined factors led the Rakas Court to conclude that Jones had a protected expectation of privacy which was vio88
lated by the warrantless search.
Similarly, Underwood was an invited overnight guest. He had permission to be in the house alone, and was the only occupant at the time of the
warrantless entry. 89 The only discernible difference between Underwood
and Jones is that Jones had a key and a few articles of clothing in the
apartment and Underwood had neither. Because the Supreme Court advocates a totality of the circumstances approach to fourth amendment analysis, the determination of a legitimate expectation of privacy should not
turn on the presence or absence of a key. 90 At most, possession of a key
indicates the ability to exclude others, which is but one of several factors
courts consider in determining expectations of privacy. 9 1 Furthermore,
Underwood was the only occupant at the time of the entry and could in
fact have excluded others by locking the door. Underwood therefore enjoyed a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in Duckett's
home and could have challenged the search.
Once it is established that Underwood had the requisite expectation of
privacy to challenge the search, the second step of the inquiry addresses
the legality of the entry: the court must decide whether the warrantless entry violated the fourth amendment. The policies behind and the
85. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
86. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-42.
87. Id. at 141.
88. Id. at 143.
89. United States v. Underwood, 693 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (advance sheets, copy on
file with the Washington Law Review), withdrawn, 704 F.2d 1059. reh'g en banc. 717 F.2d 482
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309 (1984).
90. The fact that Jones had clothing, and thus possessions, in the apartment might suggest that he
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment. Under similar reasoning. Underwood had
possessions in Duckett's home and thus also had a subjective expectation of privacy. Because Jones
had only a shirt and jacket in the apartment, however, as opposed to a full suitcase, the clothing factor
was most likely a minor influence on the Rakas Court. The Court was more likely swayed by the fact
that Jones had a key to the apartment which allowed him free access and the ability to exclude others.
91. See supra note 84.
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holdings of Payton and Steagaldindicate that police should have secured
92
a search warrant before entering Duckett's home to arrest Underwood.
Because Underwood was not arrested in his own home, the Payton exception did not apply to relieve police of the search warrant requirement.
Further, because police neither had consent nor acted under exigent circumstances, 93 the warrantless entry to arrest Underwood and the subsequent seizure of evidence was unlawful. Under this two-step analysis, the
court should have upheld the trial court's granting of Underwood's motion to suppress the illegally seized evidence.
C. A Totality of the CircumstancesApproach to Standing
The erroneousness of the Underwood decision is easily shown under
the two-step Rakas and Steagald approach because Underwood's standing follows from Jones, and because no search warrant exception applied.
More pressing are those problems potentially created by Rakas when facts
in new cases vary from the Jones-Underwoodpattern.
Under Rakas, if a court determines that a given defendant did not have
a constitutionally sufficient expectation of privacy, an unconstitutional
search and seizure will go unredressed regardless of the degree of police
misconduct. 94 If the concept of legitimate expectations of privacy is narrowly construed, police will have little incentive to comply with the warrant requirements created by Payton and clarified by Steagald.95 The parade of horrors that prompted the Steagald Court to impose a search
warrant requirement for entries into third party homes may become commonplace. 96 Police, armed solely with an arrest warrant and the slightest
suspicion that a suspect is in the house of some friend, acquaintance, or
relative can make warantless searches of each home until they find the
suspect. Yet this is the sort of activity which the framers of the fourth
amendment sought to halt and precisely the behavior warned against by
97
the Court in Steagald.
92. See supranotes 63-71 and accompanying text.
93. See supranotes 69-70.
94. Courts may not use their supervisory powers to exclude illegally seized evidence. United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The only other remedy available to those who are victims of
unconstitutional police activity is a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). These are both time
consuming and expensive, and there is no guarantee that violations will be redressed, especially when
the police have acted in good faith. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 216 n.9; Comment, supranote 5, at 64.
95. For the warrant requirements, see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
96. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (§ 1983 action involving police
searches of over 300 homes for two suspects in a police killing); see supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text; see also supranote 92.
97. Steagald, 451 U.S. at:220.
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The most inviting resolution to the problems Rakas potentially creates
is a return to the pre-Rakas standing doctrine. The "legitimately on the
premises" standard allowed for wider use of the exclusionary rule to
check unconstitutional police activities by restricting the admission of
tainted evidence at trial. 98 A return to the "legitimately on the premises"
standard, however, is unlikely given the Court's current trend restricting
use of the exclusionary rule. 99 If courts narrowly construe Rakas to require a proprietary interest in the area searched to attain standing,100 defendants arrested in third party homes will be powerless to challenge warrantless entries. However, courts could enforce the Pavton and Steagald
warrant requirements through a more generous reading of what constitutes a "legitimate expectation of privacy" under Rakas.
In Rakas, the Court recognized that a person can have a legitimate expectation of privacy that is sufficient to invoke fourth amendment protections in a place other than his own home.10 1 In fact, the Court expressly
stated that visitors in a home might be able to challenge a search when
their own property is seized during the search. 102 Given this language in
Rakas, and the fact that in Rakas the Court upheld Jones on its facts, the
conclusion that expectations of privacy will only be recognized when
grounded in proprietary interests in the area searched may misconstrue
03
Rakas. 1
Under prior substantive fourth amendment case law, expectations of
privacy have been determined through a totality of the circumstances test.
Courts applying the Rakas standing analysis should also adopt the totality
of the circumstances test for the standing inquiry. In Rakas, the Court in
98.

It is unquestionably easier for a defendant to show that he was legitimately on the premises or

charged with a possessory crime than it is to show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
violated by the search. Both the legitimately on the premises and possessory crimes standards are
straightforward requirements. The tests are whether the defendant was trespassing and what the defendant was charged with. The legitimate expectations of privacy standard, on the other hand. is not
easily defined and does not provide defendants with specific criteria for meeting the requirement.
99. See supra note 1 see also Ashdown. supra note 39. at 1290-94 (1981).
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
101.
Rakas. 439 U.S. at 142.
102. Id. at n. 11. Note that Underwood's property was seized from Duckett's home and that
arguably Underwood could have challenged the search and seizure on this basis.
103. The conclusion that Rakas requires an expectation of privacy to be grounded in proprietary
interests may result from a misreading of Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). in which the

Court held that the defendant did not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a third party's
purse into which he had thrown contraband. Important factors in Rawlings were that the defendant
and the owner of the purse were merely acquaintances, however, and the defendant himself stated
that he had no expectation that the purse would remain free from governmental intrusion. Id. at 105.
Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the purse. Rawlings, therefore, does not necessarily stand for the proposition that expectations of
privacy in seized items are insufficient to invoke the exclusionary rule unless the defendant establishes a property interest in the area searched.
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fact used this approach in its analysis of Jones to conclude that Jones had
a legitimate expectations of privacy.1 04 Such a test for standing would
allow a wider application of the exclusionary rule to redress illegal
searches and seizures than an approach which relies on proprietary interests to establish an expectation of privacy. The totality of the circumstances approach reinforces the vitality of Steagald and strengthens the
deterrent effect of Payton and Steagald on improper police activity because it grants more defendants the ability to suppress evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. Underwood, the Ninth Circuit invited police abuse
of search warrant requirements by holding that the Payton predicates satisfy fourth amendment requirements for entries into a third party residence to search for a suspect. Although under Steagald police are required to obtain a search warrant before entering a third party's home to
make an arrest, Underwood precludes the guest-arrestee from challenging
the absence of a search warrant. The holding in Underwood thus invites
violations of Steagald. Instead of extending Payton, the court should
have employed a two-step inquiry, asking first whether Underwood had a
legitimate expectation of privacy, and second whether the warrantless
search and seizure was unlawful. Applying this analysis, the court would
have reached the opposite result-Underwood possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his friend's house, and the warrantless search was
unconstitutional because no warrant exception applied.
To determine whether any particular defendant enjoyed a sufficient expectation of privacy to challenge a search and seizure, courts should employ the totality of the circumstances test currently used in substantive
fourth amendment analysis. Use of this test will lead to a greater use of
the exclusionary rule at trial and will provide police with more incentive
to follow the warrant requirements which are set forth in the language of
the fourth amendment and reinforced by the Supreme Court in Payton and
Steagald.
SarahL. Klevit

104.

See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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